NOTES AND COMMENTS
from lack of counsel, most of the circumstances would seem to indicate an independent confession.
In confession cases the court is faced with the problem of the balancing of civil liberties with the need for effective police protection." The idea of a coerced confession is abhorrent. On the other hand, the guilty should not escape punishment because of a mere technicality. In the principal case individual rights are weighed heavily at the expense of police effectiveness. If the spirit of this decision is followed the McNabb-Mallory rule is clearly in no danger of being circumvented by post-arraignment police activities.
CHARLES M. WHEDBEE
Criminal Procedure-Continuance It is the policy of the law that controversies should be settled as speedily as possible. 1 In criminal cases this right is guaranteed to the accused by the constitution.' However, undue speed may often work as much or more injustice as unnecessary delay.' To insure a prisoner adequate time to prepare his defense a continuance may often be necessary. In a criminal trial in North Carolina the granting or denial of a motion for a continuance of a case to another term or until later in the same term is a decision which rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 4 Normally continuance of a criminal case is not favored. 5 The statutory pattern for continuance of any cause is extremely broad. 6 Generally, continuances may be granted if the judge is satisfied that though the applicant has diligently prepared his case, it would be impossible for the moving party to have a fair trial at the present term for reasons beyond his control. No universal enumeration of the grounds for a continuance is possible, since the sufficiency of the cause is dependent upon and interwoven with the " See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) . 'Piedmont Wagon Co. v. Bostic, 118 N.C. 758, 24 S.E. 525 (1896) . 'U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. 'State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677, 51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949) (dissent) . ' State v. Flowers, 244 N.C. 77, 92 S.E.2d 447 (1956); State v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119, 86 S.E.2d 798 (1955); State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81 S.E.2d 778 (1954) . ' State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948) .
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 1-175 to -176 (1950) , as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-175 (Supp. 1961) .
facts of the case.7 No appeal will lie from continuing a cause, and in the case of an order refusing continuance, the court will not reverse unless the judge has plainly abused his discretion.' An exception to this general rule applies when the motion for continuance is based upon the constitutional rights of the accused to confront his accuser and to have representation of counsel.' When based upon a constitutional right, the motion ceases to be a matter of discretion and becomes a question of law, and appeal will lie from a refusal to grant the motion.' 0 In the recent case of State v. Lane 1 the defendant was indicted for a crime against nature. The judge on his own motion appointed counsel for the indigent accused at 10:30 A.M. The case was tried at 2:30 P.M. on the same day. Counsel moved for a continuance contending that he had not had adequate time to prepare the defense. The motion was denied and the defendant was convicted.' 2 On appeal the court, in reversing, found that the defendant was entitled to a reasonable time in which to prepare the case, and on the record it could not be said that this opportunity had been afforded. 193 (1927) . The right to counsel includes the right of that counsel to confer with witnesses and to prepare a defense. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) . A defendant may not be brought to trial until the right of confrontation has been met, and the duty to appoint counsel is not discharged by the assignment of counsel at such time as to preclude the giving of effective aid. Prior to State v. Lane the exception to the continuance rule had never been applied to a non-capital felony, the facts sufficient to raise the exception having been found only in capital cases where, because of special circumstances, it was found that counsel did not have time in which to prepare the case. Thus in North Carolina the accused may now appeal the denial of a continuance of any felony case when the motion is properly based upon the right to adequate preparation of his defense. The case is also significant because it illustrates the increasing willingness of the court to look at the entire circumstances of a case with a view toward determining whether on the whole record the defendant has had a fair opportunity to prepare his defense.
The case which first articulated the exception to the continuance rule in North Carolina was State v. Farrell. 13 In Farrell the defendant was charged with rape. Counsel was appointed on Saturday. The following Monday counsel asked for time to have a psychiatrist examine the defendant. When the case was called on Thursday the defendant moved for a continuance, contending that a complete psychiatric examination could not be obtained, and that family and friends were far away and could not be reached. Supporting letters to this effect were produced. The motion for continuance was denied and the defendant was found guilty. On appeal the court said that if the issue had been guilt or innocence, ample time had been allowed. But since the defense was insanity, three days for preparation and investigation was insufficient, thereby violating the right of the defendant to confrontation and effectively denying the right to counsel. The question was whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to prepare his defense, not the merits of the particular defense.
Following Farrell the court was called upon to decide the same issue in State v. Gibson. 4 In Gibson the defendant was indicted for rape. Counsel was appointed at the arraignment and the trial was scheduled for the next day. Counsel immediately moved for a continuance stating that he did not have ample time to prepare the case, and that the defendant should be given a complete mental examination. Counsel could neither state the names of witnesses he wished to call nor any special defense which he intended to use. The motion was denied and the defendant was convicted and sen- 
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tenced to death. On appeal the court stated that every man was entitled to counsel and that this would amount to nothing if sufficient time were not allowed for preparation of the defense. However, in this case the defendant did not support his motion by affidavit or other proof. The court found that the suggestions of counsel did not indicate the existence of any substantial reason for the requested postponement, and that while counsel hinted at insanity, he did not advise the trial court that such a defense was contemplated. A mere intangible hope that something helpful might turn up was found to be no basis for delaying the trial since the record failed to show that the continuance would enable counsel to obtain additional evidence or otherwise present a stronger defense. 15 The court in Gibson completely ignored the statement in Farrell that the merits of the defense were not in question and that the only inquiry was whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to prepare a defense. The court seemingly required that counsel have the defense prepared immediately upon his appointment, ignoring the fact that counsel had been appointed for that very purpose. The court in Gibson obviously begs the question of the fair opportunity to prepare the case which was the basis of the Farrell decision.'" Despite the limited interpretation placed by the Gibson decision on the manner and circumstances in which the exception to the continuance rule may be raised, there has been a trend toward the rationale of Farrell in subsequent cases.1 7
The court recently stated that while there is no rule that a case may not be tried in the same term as the indictment is rendered, except under certain circumstances in capital cases "the more speedily a case is brought to trial, after the offense has been committed or arrest made, the greater the The statute provides that in any capital case where the appointment of counsel is delayed until the term of court at which the accused is arraigned, on motion of counsel for the accused, the case shall be continued until the next ensuing term of criminal court.
17 See, e.g., State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294 (1949) , where the court reversed the denial of a motion for a continuance when a special venire drawn from outside the county was impaneled without prior notice to either side. In a dissenting opinion in State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677, 51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949) , Justice Barnhill stated that while the motion for continuance was not technically within the rule of Farrell, undue haste (one day in a murder trial), particularly in this type of case, would pervert justice as surely as unnecessary delay would defeat it.
[Vol. 41 duty of the courts to determine whether or not the accused has had a fair opportunity for trial."'
In the principal case the court followed Farrell in a per curiam opinion. The court not only extended the doctrine to include noncapital felonies but also allowed the exception to be taken upon an oral motion for continuance. The case represents a significant break from the technical distinctions laid down in Gibson with respect to the sufficiency of the allegations necessary to come within the doctrine of State v. 1arrell. 19 While the principal case provides a more liberal approach to the request for a continuance of a criminal action on constitutional grounds, it should be remembered that in order to take advantage of this doctrine counsel must prepare an adequate basis for the appeal. 20 It is always necessary to allege that constitutional rights were violated in order to preserve the appeal and come within the exception ;2 otherwise, the court will treat the motion as one within the discretion of the trial judge and will not normally reverse. 22 Preferably the record must be made to show that the continuance would enable counsel to obtain additional evidence or otherwise present a stronger defense. 23 The statutory scheme of continuance must be followed as nearly as possible, particularly in having written statements and evidence, names and addresses of witnesses, and all other possible defenses which might be urged. 2 4 " State v. Graves, 251 N.C. 550, 559, 112 S.E.2d 85, 92 (1960) .
0 Counsel for the accused in Lane made an oral motion for a continuance as did counsel for the accused in Gibson. The defense offered was much less compelling than that offered by counsel in Gibson. The defense propounded in Lane was that defendant could not have been guilty of a crime against nature per anum as alleged in the indictment because the defendant had been rendered impotent as a result of the use of a "whammey," the filler contained in a nasal inhaler. 20 State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943) . 21 The speed of the trial does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process. State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (194.7) . No standard length of time must elapse before a defendant should go on trial. Each case and its surrounding circumstances provides its own yardstick. United States v. Nierstheimer, 166 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1948) .
2" State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949) . 2" State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948) . "2 Note the similarity of the requirement for the motion as stated in Gibson to the requirements of the ordinary continuance as set out in G.S. § § 1-175 to -176.
It has been held that there was no denial of due process in refusing a continuance where a fingerprint expert could not be present at the trial, State v. Rising, 223 N.C. 747, 28 S.E.2d 221 (1943) , or where witnesses sought to be subpoenaed could not be named by the prisoner, State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81 S.E.2d 788 (1954) , or where the defendant was merely without Additional significance is added to the principal case by the de-, cision of the United States Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright 5 where the Court decreed that counsel must be provided in criminal cases. 26 Since all accused now have the right to counsel, the corollary right to adequate opportunity to prepare the defense is also extended.
While State v. Lane and Gideon v. Wainwright are large steps forward in the protection of the rights of those accused of non-capital crimes, there are many problems which remain unanswered. The courts have the duty both to provide the defendant a speedy trial and to clear overcrowded trial dockets. A continuance in every case could frustrate the speed of justice and cause administrative turmoil and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, appointment of counsel to represent indigent defendants will involve all members of the bar, including those who do not deal primarily with criminal cases. As a result continuance to allow proper preparation by attorneys will be essential in carrying out the purposes of such an appointment.
As the principal case held, the immediate solution to the problem has been to make the denial of continuance appealable. The most obvious alternative solution to the problem would be a statute similar to G.S. § 15-4.1 which would provide for an automatic continuance, in proper circumstances, upon motion of counsel. However, statutory procedures alone can never fully satisfy due process in every case. Ultimately the solution must lie in an increased awareness of this problem and a sympathetic treatment of the indigent by the trial judiciary. It is believed that the trial judges, having been apprised of the problem as presented in the principal case, are equal to the task.
Tom D. EFIRD
Damages-Collateral Source Rule-Pensions as Reducing Factor on
Personal Injury
In Browning v. The War Office 1 the English Court of Appeal considered the question of reducing an award for damages by the friends or relatives nearby to be at the trial to testify in his behalf, State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (1947) . 25 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
